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Summary  
 
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges the world is facing today. Mitigating the 
emissions that lead to climate change is therefore crucial. The objective of this paper is to 
analyse the role of corporations and the state for climate change mitigation and the 
transition towards a low carbon economy. We present an explorative study using three 
case studies from China, the United States and Malaysia to highlight the role of 
corporations in three different contexts. The roles of corporations and states are inherently 
complex; it is far from easy to make the distinction between legal and voluntary obligations. 
Often politics and business are entangled, overlapping or contradictory. We suggest that to 
achieve climate change mitigation at the global level, the complementarities of corporations 
and states need to be further explored. Globally, new forms of public-private partnerships 
with designated tasks for each stakeholder group are needed for climate change mitigation. 
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Introduction  
 
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges the world is facing today. Kofi Annan 
has stated that ‘today, millions of people are already suffering because of climate change’ 
(Global Humanitarian Forum 2009: i). The mitigation of climate change is therefore 
urgently needed. Climate change mitigation is defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) as ‘an anthropogenic intervention to reduce the anthropogenic 
forcing of the climate system; it includes strategies to reduce greenhouse gas sources 
and emissions and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks’ (IPCC 2001: 379). The IPCC’s 
Fourth Assessment Report indicates that global greenhouse gas emissions leading to 
climate change must be reduced by 80 per cent in 2030 compared to 2000 levels to avoid 
‘dangerous climate change’ (defined as a global temperature rise above 2 degrees 
Celsius) (IPCC 2007). Leading scientists suggest that even more drastic cuts are needed 
(Richardson et al. 2009). A temperature rise above 2 degrees is likely to lead to 
irreversible and abrupt changes for humans, ecosystems and economic systems (IPCC 
2007). 
 
The concepts of the ‘low carbon economy’ and ‘low carbon development’ have become 
popular world-wide due to the increased understanding that a new cleaner model for 
development and economies is needed. This is particularly relevant for developed 
countries which are responsible for 76 per cent of climate change according to the World 
Resources Institute (WRI 2005). However emerging economies such as China, India, 
Mexico, South Africa and Brazil have rapidly increasing emissions measured in absolute 
terms. 
 
Businesses have contributed their fair share of environmental pollution dating back to the 
Industrial Revolution and more recently related to environmental (and human) 
catastrophes such as Bhopal, Exxon Valdez, BP Deepwater Horizon, dumping highly toxic 
waste in developing countries and exploiting natural resources all over the world. Clausen 
et al. (2005) argue that businesses, and particularly corporations, play a double-edged 
role: they can either foster the development and diffusion of environmental technology 
and standards or they can actively hinder environmental standards and policies by 
lobbying, green-washing and market-based activities. 
 
We argue that the role of corporations within climate governance needs to be discussed 
at more length since corporations can play a large role in 1 contributing to climate change, 
2 mitigating climate change and 3 international climate governance. The objective of this 
paper is therefore to analyse the role of corporations and the state for climate change 
mitigation and the transition towards a low carbon economy. In recent discussions the role 
between the state and corporations for climate change mitigation seems to have been 
blurred as responsibility to act on climate change rests with both actors. We therefore aim 
to present an explorative study using three case studies to highlight the role of 
corporations in three different contexts of climate change mitigation. 
 
We use the case study approach developed by Yin (2009). We chose case studies from 
various income groups: a high income country (United States (US)), a higher middle 
income country (Malaysia) and a lower middle income country (China). We chose case 
studies of a politically diverse nature and diverse approaches to climate change policy. 
The full reasoning of these case study choices is discussed in section 1. Our aim is to 
highlight what we can learn from these cases and how they can improve our theoretical 
understanding of the role of corporations in climate change mitigation. Section 2 presents 
the case studies from China, the US and Malaysia, section 3 discusses the findings and 
section 4 concludes the paper. 
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1 Case study approach  
 
The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) argues that low carbon growth 
needs policies and incentives put in place by states on one side, and low carbon business 
models and business innovations on the other side (DFID 2009: 58). This paper aims to 
explore the role of corporations in climate change mitigation in three different contexts and 
to elaborate what we can learn from these three diverging contexts. To analyse the case 
study evidence, we examine multiple case studies and compare them to each other. Yin 
(2009) describes this analytical approach as ‘cross-case synthesis’. Table 1.1 shows the 
approach we take to the case studies. 
 
 
Table 1.1 Components of case study research design based on Yin (2009) 
 
Components of research design Approach 
Research question What role do corporations play in climate 
change mitigation at a country level? 
Propositions The role of climate change mitigation is 
either predominantly state-driven, 
corporation-driven or a combination of the 
two 
Unit of analysis Corporations and states 
Logic linking the data to the 
propositions 
Cross-case synthesis 
Criteria for interpreting the findings Using both qualitative and quantitative data 
 
 
The emphasis of each case study is on exploring the role of climate change mitigation in 
diverging contexts; to understand what role corporations play in different contexts and what 
can we learn from these examples. We have selected three country case studies based on 
the following criteria: We chose case studies from various income groups, including a high 
income country (US), a higher middle income country (Malaysia) and a lower middle income 
country (China). Ideally we would have analysed a low income country in addition, however 
we were unable to do this due to limited data. We chose case studies of a politically diverse 
nature: a country with a socialist and formerly centrally planned economy (China), a country 
with a capitalist economy (US) and a country with a capitalist economy that has been 
influenced by socialist and communist movements (Malaysia). The political economy in 
each country influences the role and status of states, state-owned corporations and private 
corporations. We chose case studies with diverse per capita greenhouse gas emission 
levels: a country with very high per capita emissions (US), one with average per capita 
emissions (Malaysia) and one with low per capita emissions (China). We chose case 
studies of countries that have a diverse track record in terms of their commitment to tackling 
climate change. However, it has to be noted here that since the Copenhagen negotiations in 
2009, many countries are considered by Germanwatch (2011) as failing to deliver their 
climate change commitments and ‘climate change champions’ seem to be non-existent 
compared to previous years. Finally, we chose case studies which show how climate 
change mitigation is predominantly state-driven (China), corporation-driven (US) or a 
combination of the two (Malaysia). 
 
For the above named reasons we have chosen to focus on China, Malaysia and the US. 
We recognise that despite the above mentioned differences, these countries have 
similarities which make them comparable. All three countries are major greenhouse gas 
emitters, major economies, and have a heavy reliance on fossil fuels due to abundant 
domestic resources (US: oil, China: coal, Malaysia: natural gas). Despite their efforts, none 
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of these countries has been successful (yet) in introducing a low carbon economy; however 
all of these countries consider the establishment of a low carbon economy crucial for their 
domestic economy and their international competitiveness. We use the example of the 
government-regulated wind energy sector in China to elaborate this. We use examples from 
the US where the government fails to provide strict national policies and legislations on 
climate change and where initiatives from businesses and corporations play a role for 
climate change mitigation. Finally, the third case study demonstrates how corporations and 
the state can be equally influential players driving development. We elaborate the example 
of Malaysia to demonstrate how the state aims to promote climate change mitigation efforts 
on one side, but on the other side it allows large-scale commercial deforestation by 
corporations for palm oil plantations. 
 
Measures for climate change mitigation can broadly be classified into three categories: 
mitigation through the use of (1) low carbon energy, such as renewable energy, (2) energy 
efficient technologies, and (3) the protection of natural carbon sinks, such as forests and 
land (DFID 2009). This paper aims to assess a range of these different measures in the 
case studies. Our general analytical strategy for the case study research is the dual use of 
qualitative and quantitative data. We use two major sources of evidence: qualitative 
information about climate change, energy and forestry policies, and quantitative data about 
emissions, energy use and forestry. The policy data collection is based on the following 
system: national policies come from national authorities and ministries such as China’s 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and Malaysia’s Ministry of the 
Environment. Additional climate policies come from submissions to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) such as those following the 
Copenhagen Accord in 2010. Quantitative energy, climate, forestry and emissions data 
come from internationally acknowledged multilateral organisations such as the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), the World Bank and UN agencies. Additional information from journal 
articles is based on well-established peer-reviewed journals in the fields of energy, climate 
change, forestry and development and is limited to well-respected journals in their 
respective fields, such as the journal of Energy Policy. 
 
 
2 Case studies  
 
We present three case studies from China, the US and Malaysia which indicate the 
ambiguous role of corporations and states in climate change mitigation. We present a case 
study from the Chinese wind energy industry, US corporate strategies for emission 
reductions, and Malaysia’s approach to biofuels from palm oil plantations. These different 
case studies have been selected because they provide examples of how business and 
states are dealing with climate change mitigation in each of the respective countries. These 
different case studies provide insights about the role of businesses and states, their 
competencies, powers and limits for climate change mitigation. 
  
2.1 Case study 1: China – climate change mitigation efforts are predominantly 
state-driven 
 
The first case study relates to climate change mitigation in China, with specific reference to 
its rapidly growing wind energy sector. 
 
 
2.1.1 Policy framework for climate change mitigation: China 
From a climate policy perspective, the Climate Change Performance Index 2011 China is 
56th on a list of 60 countries ranked by climate performance which takes into account 
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emission trends, emission levels and climate policy (Germanwatch 2011). Despite this bad 
ranking, China ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) Convention in 1993 (UNFCCC 2010a), approved the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 
(UNFCCC 2010b), and submitted Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) as a 
follow-up to the Copenhagen Accord in early 2010 (UNFCCC 2010d). Nevertheless China is 
a non-Annex I country and doesn’t have quantified emission reduction targets. 
 
The Chinese government launched its National Climate Change Programme in 2007 
(NDRC 2007a) and its White Paper on Climate Change in 2008. The White Paper 
introduced national energy intensity targets for a 20 per cent reduction by 2010 in 
comparison to 2005 and targets for closing down inefficient coal power stations, decreasing 
the share of heavy industry, investing in energy efficiency and promoting renewable energy 
(Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2008). China’s 
much debated position at the Copenhagen and Cancun climate negotiations was a 45 per 
cent reduction in carbon intensity reduction by 2020 in comparison to 2005 (UNFCCC 
2010d). 
 
From an energy perspective, there are a range of policies and legislative frameworks in 
place to foster a low carbon economy, such as the Chinese Renewable Energy Law from 
2006 which aims to ‘promote the development and utilization of renewable energy’ (National 
People’s Congress of China 2005: 1). The law sets no specific targets for renewable 
energy, but provides the legislative framework for other policies, obligatory grid connections 
for renewable energy systems, cost-sharing agreements between utilities and end-users, 
pricing agreements like feed-in tariffs, surcharges and concessions to guarantee the market 
(Baker and McKenzie 2007; Urban et al. 2009). Other policies which promote low carbon 
energy are the Five Year Plans, most recently the 12th Five Year Plan for 2011–2015. The 
government body NDRC introduced Renewable Energy Targets in 2007 which are 
comparable to those of the European Union. Fifteen per cent of the total primary energy 
should be from renewable energy by 2020. This policy promotes biomass, geothermal 
energy, hydropower, solar power, tidal energy and wind energy and aims to use these 
renewable energy sources to achieve decentralised electrification in remote rural areas 
(NDRC 2007b; Urban et al. 2009). 
 
China is also a major benefiter of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). China has 
implemented the world’s greatest number of CDM projects and reported the largest 
emission reductions on the global CDM market (Wang 2010). 
 
2.1.2 The role of the state in climate change mitigation: China 
Despite the turbulent Copenhagen and Cancun climate change negotiations and the blame 
that China received from many sides regarding the weak outcome, the Chinese government 
is committed to tackling climate change. The Chinese government has realised the 
disadvantages that a high carbon pathway could bring and makes efforts to move towards a 
low carbon economy for three key reasons: (1) energy security, (2) economic 
competitiveness and first mover advantages, and (3) climate change mitigation. As a 
formerly centrally-planned economy and with a growing business sector, the Chinese state 
remains the driver of climate change mitigation actions and creates an enabling 
environment for low carbon businesses. A case in point is the wind sector. Wind resources 
in China are reported to be large. The World Energy Council’s World Energy Assessment 
2007 reports that China has 1,000 GW total exploitable wind energy resources (WEC 2007) 
of which 750 GW are reported to be situated offshore (Lewis and Wiser 2007). 
 
The Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC) reports that China has doubled its installed wind 
energy capacity for the fifth consecutive year. The country had more than 25 GW installed 
wind capacity at the end of 2009 (GWEC 2010). The official target of the government was to 
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reach 5 GW by 2010 (Jingfeng et al. 2006), which was revised to 10 GW by NDRC due to a 
rapidly expanding market. The new ‘unofficial target’ of the Chinese government is to reach 
150 GW installed wind energy capacity by 2020. Especially the windy region Inner Mongolia 
is endowed with high wind resources and is therefore the key to the Chinese wind energy 
development plans. Chinese authorities further recently announced that China will begin to 
construct the world’s largest offshore wind farm in Jiangsu, close to Shanghai (China 
Climate Change Info-Net 2010: 1). While these developments are implemented by firms – 
often large state-owned firms – the key driver behind it is the government and its many 
bodies and authorities that plan, finance and implement low carbon projects. These 
developments are primarily driven by the Five Years Plans and the plans of the NDRC. The 
national targets for wind energy from the Five Year Plans decided by national government 
are translated into provincial targets and even firm-level targets. 
 
Historically, the Chinese government promoted foreign donations and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) funded wind pilot projects from Denmark, Germany and Spain in the 
1980s and 1990s. In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the Chinese government promoted 
the development of indigenous local wind energy technology and wind energy markets. This 
involved a 70 per cent local content requirement. The Kyoto Protocol and the UN regime for 
climate change mitigation was an external driver for expanding the Chinese wind market. 
The government aims since 2010 to scale up its wind farms, markets and technologies and 
to export Chinese wind energy technology globally (Dai 2011). 
 
The Chinese relationship between state and firms is very strong: All of the leading wind 
manufacturers are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) including Goldwind, Sinovel, Dongfang 
Electric, and Guodian United Power. SOEs make up 90 per cent of firms engaged in wind 
power generation and SOEs make up 97 per cent of all companies engaged in wind power 
concessions (Liu and Kokko 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, the impressive figures and policies supporting China’s low carbon 
development have to be considered with caution. Many of the low carbon policies 
implemented by the central government in Beijing are obstructed due to the sometimes 
reluctant implementation by provincial and local governments and authorities. Recent 
research by Wang et al. (2010) has shown that there are major barriers to China’s low 
carbon development. First, the share of renewable energy in total energy consumption is 
decreasing instead of increasing, due to rapid growth of fossil fuel capacity. Second, the 
efficiency of renewable energy technology is low as often the quality of the technologies is 
not to the latest standard and efficiencies for renewable energy technology are generally 
rather low. Third, many renewable energy technologies are not connected to the central grid 
as this requires high costs and logistic resources. The installed renewable capacity is 
therefore often wasted. This could be interpreted as a market failure, particularly in the case 
where it is not financially viable for businesses to connect installed renewable energy 
technology to the grid and where government authorities are reluctant to monitor 
implementation (Wang et al. 2010: 1872). 
 
2.1.3 The role of the corporations in climate change mitigation: China 
China is not only the world’s largest CO2 emitter; it is also leading the race to develop low 
carbon technologies. Especially wind energy and solar energy are major markets in China. 
According to GWEC, China became the world’s largest wind energy market in early 2010 
and has a large number of private, state-owned and public-private firms engaging in these 
sectors for domestic use and for export (GWEC 2010). According to Chinese sources there 
are over 90 wind energy technology firms in China (Lui and Kokko 2010). Key players are 
Goldwind, Sinovel, Dong Fang, Shanghai Electric Corporation and Shanghai Dong Hai 
Wind Power (Dai 2011). SOEs such as Goldwind, Dong Fang and Shanghai Electric 
Corporation, and public private partnerships dominate the wind and solar sectors. Key 
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corporations such as Goldwind, Sinovel and Shanghai Dong Hai Wind Power are owned by 
the state and receive state funding (Dai 2011). Leading foreign wind energy firms such as 
Vestas, GE Wind, Gamesa, Suzlon, Siemens, REPower, Nordex and Mitsubishi have 
established joint ventures in China. Access to the market for foreign investors has often 
been traded for a share of ownership of foreign firms in China. 
 
Today Chinese renewable energy firms have firm-level targets for installing renewable 
energy. These targets are derived from the central government-led Five Years Plans. Many 
Chinese wind energy firms aim to install the required capacity as quickly as possible to 
ensure access to the best wind resources and the most suitable land areas. 
 
China’s rapid rise in wind and solar technology production and its cheap production costs 
make it a serious competitor to established European and US wind and solar companies. 
While the production capacity of Chinese wind turbine manufacturers is growing, leading 
German and Danish firms are increasingly concerned about China’s alleged infringement of 
intellectual property rights, the copying of foreign technology and restricted access to the 
Chinese wind market which until 2009 required 70 per cent Chinese content requirements 
for wind turbines (Lema et al. 2011). The competition with US low carbon companies is 
even fiercer as the US government accuses the Chinese government of unfair subsidising 
for its low carbon firms. This issue has even been taken to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). 
 
 
2.2 Case study 2: US – climate change mitigation efforts are predominantly 
corporation-driven  
 
The second case study relates to climate change mitigation in the US. We present a case 
study from US corporate strategies for emission reductions, because they show how 
business and states are dealing with climate change mitigation in the US. 
 
2.2.1 Policy framework for climate change mitigation: US 
From a climate policy perspective, the Climate Change Performance Index 2011 the US is 
54th on a list of 60 countries ranked by climate performance which takes into account 
emission trends, emission levels and climate policy (Germanwatch 2011). 
 
The US ratified the UN Climate Change Convention in 1992 (UNFCCC 2010a), but never 
ratified or accepted the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 2010b). The US government fails to 
provide strict international and national policies and legislations for climate change 
mitigation. The Bush administration was infamous for its almost decade-long boycott of the 
Kyoto Protocol and its denial of climate change. Many had hoped that the Obama 
administration would bring along a fundamental change. However, the US remained rigid in 
Copenhagen and Cancun and only presented weak targets which were below those of the 
European Union and other developed countries. Though Obama was hailed for his success 
in achieving the deal which led to the non-legally binding Copenhagen Accord, the US 
national targets remain weak with only a 17 per cent reduction of CO2 emissions planned 
for 2020 compared to 2005 levels (not 1990 levels as most other countries) (UNFCCC 
2010c). These targets were made in anticipation of the forthcoming US energy and climate 
legislation. The future US emission reduction targets set forth as a response to the 
Copenhagen Accord were promised by the US Office of the Special Envoy for Climate 
Change to ‘entail a 30 per cent reduction in 2025 and a 42 per cent reduction in 2030, in 
line with the goal to reduce emissions 83 per cent by 2050’ (UNFCCC 2010d: 2). A similar 
legislation was already signed off by the House of Representatives in 2009, however in July 
2010, the US Senate decided not to pass the anticipated climate bill on which these targets 
were based. The Senate thereby rejected its planned national cap-and-trade system and it 
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also rejected a modest electric utilities bill (Crook 2010). This is a major disappointment for 
tackling climate change at the national level, but also at international level. 
 
2.2.2 The role of the state in climate change mitigation: US 
Nation-wide legislation on climate change is lacking in the US. The above case shows that 
the US Senate does not support legislation on climate change at the national level. The 
most ‘advanced’ national legislations the US can offer which relates to some extent to 
climate change are the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and the 1992 Energy Policy Act. In 
the absence of national regulation and a failure of the Senate to take action on climate 
change, there is a strong move to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the US through 
using existing federal authorities and the actions of federal states. There are 10 federal 
states with emission reduction targets set by legislation (WRI 2010). These states include 
California, which has the reputation of being the ‘greenest’ or most climate-friendly of all US 
states, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
Oregon and Washington. There are six provinces which have executive orders to reduce 
emissions, either on top of existing legislation such as in California, or as a separate policy, 
such as in Arizona, Florida, Michigan, New Mexico and New York. The most ambitious 
target is set by California, Florida, Massachusetts and New York which have legislation in 
place to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80 per cent compared to 1990 levels by 2050 
(WRI 2010). Nevertheless the base lines differ, with some states using 1990 as a baseline, 
which is aligned with the Kyoto Protocol, and other states using 2000 or 2005 as a baseline. 
There are three regional cap-and-trade systems agreed for the Midwest, which involves six 
states, the Western Climate Initiative, which involves seven states, and the Regional 
Greenhouse gas Initiative at the East Coast of the US, which involves nine states. Together 
these states represent more than 40 per cent of the US federal states (WRI 2010). 
 
Despite the climate-friendly legislation of states, more advanced legislation at the national 
level is lacking to date. While national legislation to tackle climate change seems to have 
been abandoned, businesses are increasingly pushing forward policies for a low carbon 
economy. 
 
2.2.3 The role of corporations in climate change mitigation: US 
The US has a leading wind, solar and biomass industry. The American Wind Energy 
Association (AWEA) reports that in 2009, a total capacity of 35.6 GW wind energy was 
installed which is estimated to save about 62 million tons of CO2 annually and is ‘equivalent 
to taking 10.5 million cars off the road’ (AWEA 2010: 1). Nevertheless, the AWEA reports 
that in 2010 capacity increases stalled. This was reported to be due to a lack of ‘long-term 
national commitment to renewable energy’ which is considered a key factor why the US 
wind industry is lagging behind other countries’ wind energy markets (AWEA 2010: 1). 
Below we provide some examples of how businesses drive climate change mitigation 
regulations and at the same time have the potential to increase their own competitive 
advantage even in the absence of adequate national policies. We acknowledge the wide 
range of corporate climate initiatives in the US, however due to limited space we will only 
explore a few innovative ones which have the potential to directly influence national climate 
policy. 
 
Dunn (2005) reports about US business engagement with the flexibility mechanisms 
established by the Kyoto Protocol: businesses can have internal and external control 
measures such as greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories and management, GHG emission 
reduction targets and internal emission trading schemes. An interesting business reaction to 
missing national legislation is the formation of the US Climate Action Partnership (USCAP). 
USCAP was formed in 2007 and currently includes 28 companies as well as environmental 
organisations, including Chrysler, DuPont, Ford, General Electric, General Motors, Johnson 
& Johnson, Pepsi, Rio Tinto, Shell and Siemens. The aim of USCAP is to lobby the US 
12
 
 
government to set legally binding emission reduction targets and to reduce GHG emissions. 
USCAP published its ‘Blueprint for Legislative Action’ in 2007 which calls for ‘prompt 
enactment of national legislation in the United States to slow, stop and reverse the growth 
of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over the shortest time reasonably achievable’ (USCAP 
2007: 1). In its policies, the organisation calls for an emission reduction of 80 per cent by 
2050, meaning that the US economy should only emit 20 per cent of its 2005 emissions. To 
achieve these targets, the organisation suggests introducing a national cap-and-trade 
system, fostering innovation such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and advocates for 
low carbon and energy efficient technology for transport and buildings (USCAP 2007). 
Nevertheless one could argue that this system lacks stringency as it is only based on soft 
laws, does not provide enforcement mechanisms and there is a high risk of free-riding for 
companies outside of the USCAP association. 
 
According to Business and the Environment (2009), the US corporations Levi Strauss, Nike, 
Starbucks, Sun Microsystems and The Timberland Company joined with the Coalition for 
Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) in 2008 to develop a new business 
alliance. This business alliance has the aim to influence the development of a strong US 
climate and energy policy to achieve a low carbon economy. The new alliance is called 
Business for Innovative Climate and Energy Policy (BICEP). The initiative has ambitious 
GHG emission targets: 25 per cent GHG reduction by 2020 below 1990 levels and 80 per 
cent GHG reduction by 2050 below 1990 levels, establish an US emission trading system, 
increase energy efficiency by 200 per cent, promote fuel-efficient vehicles, increase 
investments in low carbon energy and energy efficient technology, promote green jobs, 
introduce a renewable standard which means that all electricity generated must come from 
at least 20 per cent of renewable energy sources by 2020 and 30 per cent by 2030, and 
‘limit the construction of new coal-fired power plants to those that capture and store carbon 
emissions’ (Business and the Environment 2009: 14–15). These targets are not only 
ambitious, but also exceed the climate and energy policies that most states currently have 
in place. Leading US corporations are here the drivers of radical climate change mitigation 
policy. This is not only driven by the desire to increase these corporations’ reputation or to 
develop a good Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy, but by the belief that a 
fundamental change of the system is needed and that this cannot be achieved by the state 
alone. Lobbying plays an important part of this process. Lobbying by corporations in the 
climate change arena is however nothing new. Oil ‘giants’ such as Exxon Mobile have been 
known in the past to ‘argue against business responsibility for global warming’, however 
‘competitors such as BP or Shell more recently have come to the conclusion that there is a 
moral responsibility for business to engage in GHG emission reduction’ (Levy 2005 in: 
Eberlein and Matten 2009: 244). Interestingly, the BICEP case study might have turned the 
tables by lobbying for strict climate and energy policy instead of against it. In this case, 
business ethics form a surrogate regulation and have the long-term aim to contribute 
towards legislation. 
 
Nevertheless while these are powerful aspirations, the effect at the national level remains to 
be seen. The above mentioned approaches seem to be fragmented with a lack of cohesion 
among different firms, associations of firms and industries. Free-riding, the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms, the risk of green-washing to improve business reputations and 
sometimes low impacts on national emissions pose major challenges. 
 
2.3 Case study 3: Malaysia – climate change mitigation efforts are both equally 
state-driven and corporation-driven 
 
The third case study relates to climate change mitigation in Malaysia, with specific reference 
to its large tropical forests and the biofuel industry. We present this case study because it is 
an example of how business and states are dealing with climate change mitigation in 
Malaysia. 
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2.3.1 Policy framework for climate change mitigation: Malaysia 
From a climate policy perspective, Malaysia has been ranked in the Climate Change 
Performance Index 2011 as number 53 of 60 countries based on their emission trends, 
emission levels and climate policy (Germanwatch 2011). In terms of climate policy, Malaysia 
ratified the UN climate change convention in 1994 and also ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 
2002. The government thus has an interest in developing and implementing policies for 
mitigating climate change. Nevertheless, as a non-Annex I country it does not have 
quantified emission reduction targets. More recently Malaysia has been known for its 
unwillingness to commit to tackling climate change. 114 countries world-wide have agreed 
to the Copenhagen Accord and another 24 countries have expressed their intension to 
agree to the Accord (UNFCCC 2010f). Despite these global efforts, Malaysia has not 
agreed to the Copenhagen Accord. 
 
There are no national climate change policies in Malaysia to date, but there are a range of 
environmental and energy policies, such as the Environmental Quality Act of 1974 
(Department of Environment of Malaysia, Ministry of Science, Technology and the 
Environment 2010). The key energy policies are the 1974 Petroleum Development Act 
under which the state-owned corporation Petronas was established, the 1979 National 
Energy Policy, the 1980 National Depletion Policy which aimed to safeguard natural oil 
reserves as a response to rapid exploitation, the 1981 Four Fuel Diversification Policy which 
was ‘designed to prevent over-dependence on oil as the main energy resource’ and which 
introduced a diversification of the energy portfolio (EIB 2010: 1). More recently, Malaysia 
introduced the Fifth Fuel Policy which was included in the Eighth Malaysia Plan for 2001–
2005: renewable energy was introduced as a fifth fuel in the energy portfolio besides oil, 
natural gas, coal and large hydropower. The focus is mainly on biomass, biogas, solar and 
small hydropower. The Ninth Malaysia Plan for 2006–2010 aimed to further promote 
renewable energy and energy efficiency with the aim to reduce the dependency on oil 
products (Mohamed and Lee 2006; Haw et al. 2006; EIB 2010). 
 
In terms of forestry policies, policy-making is a responsibility of the three state governments 
in Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak. Peninsular Malaysia has the National Forest 
Policy from 1978. The Sarawak Forest Ordinance from 1954 is the key legislation in 
Sarawak, West Borneo and the Sabah Forest Enactment from 1968 is the key legislation in 
Sabah, East Borneo. Although these three key legislations have developed separately, they 
share the common features that forests need to be protected, but can be harvested for 
export purposes at the same time (Woon and Norini 2002). 
 
2.3.2 The role of the state in climate change mitigation: Malaysia 
Malaysia is an oil producing country; however it is not formerly associated with the OPEC 
(Oil Producing and Exporting Countries) and the notorious blocking role the OPEC has 
played in climate negotiations. Despite this positioning, climate policies have been missing 
from the wider policy arena in Malaysia. The state’s engagement in the state-owned oil and 
gas corporation Petronas is likely to have an impact on the government’s stance towards 
climate policies. Besides the close relationship between the state and oil and gas 
corporations, another major issue is Malaysia’s increased rate of deforestation which rapidly 
increases its GHG emissions. Primal rainforest in Malaysia, particularly in the two states 
Sabah and Sarawak of Borneo, has seen increased logging and deforestation for palm oil 
plantations that are being used to produce chemicals, cosmetics, food, plastics and, 
ironically, biofuels (McMorrow and Talip 2001). The government of Malaysia’s complex 
political position is to aim for economic growth by exploiting natural resources and utilising 
fossil fuels on one side, while on the other side ensuring nature conservation and 
environmental protection (Energy Information Bureau (EIB) 2010). Malaysia’s energy and 
climate change policies demonstrate the state’s split relationship towards natural resource 
exploitation and environmental protection. This is reflected in key energy and forestry 
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policies which enable the exploitation of resources through state-owned firms like Petronas 
and create enabling environments for foreign firms at the same time as they encourage the 
safeguarding of natural resources and avoiding over-exploitation. 
 
In terms of forestry and biofuels, the state governments have the main jurisdiction over their 
forest resources. There are three separate bodies which play a key role in Malaysia’s forest 
policies, namely the Peninsular Malaysia Forestry Department, the Forestry Department 
Sabah (East Borneo) and the Forestry Department Sarawak (West Borneo). ‘Each state is 
empowered to enact laws on forestry and to formulate forestry policy independently’; 
‘nonetheless, a close relationship between the states and federal government is essential 
regarding all land and forestry issues’ (Woon and Norini 2002: 12). The federal state 
provides technical assistance and training support, while the national state provides the 
overall enabling environment. 
 
While the government takes a paradoxical approach by ensuring firms can exploit natural 
resources and safeguarding these resources at the same time, another important actor is 
aiming to influence policy-making, namely Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). Indigenous 
groups from Borneo have increasingly raised their voice in the UN climate policy process 
about devastating deforestation in Borneo. They proclaimed the need for Malaysia to 
participate in activities for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD), particularly to stop deforestation from palm oil plantations. Indigenous people 
depend on forests for their livelihoods, including for food, housing, and medicine. The 
logging and the industrial activity in the jungle decreases the quantity and quality of habitat 
for animals and plant species. The palm oil monoculture plantations further reduce 
biodiversity (Fitzherbert et al. 2008). The state engages actively with energy and forestry 
corporations and creates legislation to suit their interests; however there seems to be 
limited engagement between the state and indigenous groups for protecting their interests. 
 
2.3.3 The role of corporations in climate change mitigation: Malaysia 
Renewable energy firms play only a marginal role in Malaysia. The most important sector 
related to climate change mitigation in Malaysia is the forestry sector. Deforestation is on 
the rise, and one of the key causes is the increasing demand for palm oil. 
 
While the key role of palm oil corporations is to make profit, there are close connections to 
the state and state funding. In Malaysia the term ‘Government Linked Corporations (GLC)’ 
is often used. GLCs are corporations which have close links to the government, but are not 
necessarily state-owned. This is one of the key differences to China, where state-owned 
enterprises are abundant for climate change mitigation, and the US, where private firms are 
abundant. In Malaysia 60 per cent of palm oil land was in private ownership in 2005; 
however the government holds shares of some of these ‘private’ corporations (Ramasamy 
et al. 2005). The largest corporation is Sime Darby which developed as a merger of eight 
palm oil corporations and is now the world’s largest listed palm oil corporation (Sime Darby 
2006). The government played a key role in negotiating this merger. Other key players are 
Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad and IOI Corporation Berhad (Ramasamy et al. 2005). In 
2010, state-owned corporations such as Petronas and foreign corporations such as Shell 
were also engaged in palm oil production in Borneo. 
 
The corporations engaged in the palm oil industry have in recent years come under 
pressure due to their social and environmental impacts. As a consequence, today about 10 
per cent of all corporations participate in social and environmental reporting, whereas the 
practice was non-existent in the past. Nevertheless, 10 per cent is a very low number 
overall, particularly considering the high environmental and social impacts of the palm oil 
industry. The fact that social and environmental reporting is starting to take place in the 
palm oil industry is largely a result of lobbying by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
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such as Sahabat Alam Malaysia and the Environmental Protection Society of Malaysia 
(Othman and Ameer 2010). Other studies suggest that Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) has not progressed very far in Malaysia (Othman and Ameer 2010). Although the 
government has an interest in promoting environmental reporting, reducing environmental 
degradation and contributing to climate change mitigation, the government’s powers seems 
to be limited, while corporations and their take on corporate citizenship seem to be the 
drivers of policy and practice. 
 
Another interesting development is happening in Malaysia: according to an insider, Chinese 
companies working on the CDM are starting to invest in palm oil plantations for biofuels in 
tropical forests in Malaysia as carbon offsetting projects. Under the CDM, developed 
countries are paying developing countries for climate-friendly development projects 
(Dechezlepretre et al. 2009). At this point, Chinese companies are starting to invest in 
offsetting initiatives in other developing countries with funding received from developed 
countries. While the palm oil plantations will produce palm oil which can then be converted 
into biodiesel or bioethanol for climate-friendly transport, the logging of the tropical forest in 
Malaysia has a high environmental impact and releases high amounts of greenhouse gas 
emissions. One mitigation measure is thereby contributing to another counter-measure. 
This development is tolerated by the Malaysian government, but driven by FDI from foreign 
corporations, multinational corporations such as Shell and national corporations like 
Petronas and others. 
 
 
3 Discussion: the role of the corporation  
 
This section first discusses the role of corporations from a theoretical perspective and 
afterwards this discussion links the theoretical perspectives to the three case studies 
presented above from China, US and Malaysia. 
 
For years, there has been a lively discussion about the role of corporations in national and 
global systems of governance. One view of corporate citizenship is to highlight ‘a firm’s 
membership in society’ (Sison 2009: 236). Corporations are particular individuals since they 
are a legal construction which lacks both ‘bodies to be jailed’ and ‘souls to be damned’ 
(Sison 2009: 236). Despite not being an individual, physical person, a corporation is still a 
subject with rights and responsibilities. Corporations can sell and buy commodities (rights) 
and they have to honour contracts and pay taxes (duties). Corporations have the goal to 
produce goods and services for the benefits of shareholders directly and the greater public 
indirectly. Corporate citizenship is in the Anglo-Saxon tradition first and foremost a legal 
concept where rights and duties are minimal requirements (Sison 2009: 237). Caroll argues 
that corporate citizens do also have the ethical responsibility to do what is right, fair and just, 
and the discretionary responsibility to contribute to various kinds of social, educational, 
recreational or cultural purposes (Caroll 1979: 500). These responsibilities often rely on 
voluntarism. Caroll indicates that philanthropic roles ‘are purely voluntary, and the decision to 
assume them is guided only by a business’s desire to engage in social roles not mandated, 
not required by law, and not even generally expected of businesses in an ethical sense’ 
(Caroll 1979: 500). Such a voluntarism could be problematic when it comes to climate 
change mitigation where it could impose free-riding or green washing. One could argue that 
corporations should just adhere to legislations or rely on a few selected corporate voluntary 
actions. 
 
One could argue from a Friedman perspective that there is no corporate responsibility per se 
beyond making profit and obeying the law (Friedman 1970). This would make corporate 
citizens very focused on economic and legal goals and discriminate against social, ethical 
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and environmental goals. This would imply a more limited view of the role of corporations. 
Such a system has at least in theory been dominant in Western countries where liberal 
governments have tried to outline a distinction between the public and private sphere where 
‘the public sphere, often coterminous with the state, is the authoritative rule maker and 
legislator’ (Mörth 2008: 104–5). The nation state as law-maker is then considered as the 
primary political community, there is no authority above or below. This means that ‘a 
sovereign state is a territorial jurisdiction: i.e. the territorial limits within which state authority 
may be exercised on an exclusive basis’ (Jackson 1999: 432). 
 
The opposite approach would be that corporations would participate on more equal footings 
with the state in climate governance. Levy and Kolk indicate that ‘companies can attempt to 
postpone regulation by debating the science of climate change and the economic cost of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) controls, or they can invest in new low-emission technologies; 
companies can attempt to invest early and gain first-mover advantages, or wait until the 
technological turmoil and regulatory uncertainty has subsided’ (Levy and Kolk 2005). Pinske 
and Kolk (2009) report a range of strategic options for addressing climate change in the 
business sector. They distinguish between two major aims: innovation, such as through R&D 
for new low carbon technologies, and compensation, such as through emission trading. 
Pinkse and Kolk (2009) further distinguish between the nature of the organisation: internal 
(company itself), vertical (supply chain) and horizontal (beyond the supply chain). 
 
Depending on whether the corporation is more oriented towards innovation or compensation, 
this opens up space for the following strategies: process innovation, product development, 
new product / new market combinations and internal transfer of emission credits, supply 
chain measures and acquisition of emission credits (Pinske and Kolk 2009). Another 
approach would be to take the role of the corporations one step further; the corporations 
would participate in the regulation. Beckman and Pies (2008: 54) argue that corporate 
citizenship should reflect the core idea of a civil society in ‘which all participants themselves 
carry responsibility for the order of their community’ and they have ‘ordo-responsibility’ which 
could be seen as a general responsibility for the institutional order. They argue that to some 
degree it would be in many corporations’ interest if they accepted ‘ordo-responsibility in rule-
setting processes and rule-finding discourse’ (Beckman and Pies 2008: 54). The 
corporations would not just obey regulations and ethics but actually create and monitor such 
regulations. Such governance does not produce hard laws, but soft laws which mean they 
lack the possibility of legal sanctions. These regulations are deliberative and consensual; 
they take for granted a more cooperative relationship between governments and 
corporations (Mörth 2008: 107). 
 
The case studies we presented in section 2 indicate that the practical role of corporations is 
far more difficult and ambiguous than the theoretical perspectives suggest. 
 
The US case study elaborated how businesses in the US aim to create their own initiatives 
and lobby the state when it comes to developing policies for climate change mitigation. 
Climate mitigation efforts tend to become increasingly corporation-driven. Many businesses 
seem to have grown out of the state-driven role as today they can challenge nation states as 
a driver for climate and energy policies. This means that these businesses and corporations 
are not only the motors of growth and employment in the low carbon sectors, but they also 
aim to directly influence policy-making to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation efforts 
and to introduce new legislation that favours low carbon development over high carbon 
development. Since the US state has relatively low involvement and has rather lax 
regulations in enforcing and financial incentives to promote climate change mitigation this 
becomes the role of corporations to lobby and/or try to enforce some binding regulations. 
The key risks associated with this approach are free-riding, policies and agreements which 
are incoherent, fragmented and essentially piecemeal, or in the worst case even tokenism. 
Jones and Haigh (2007: 68) argue that a ‘well-functioning system of corporate citizenship 
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might require, if paradoxical, a strong state to design and administer necessary sanctions’. 
The role of the corporations is markedly different in China and Malaysia. The case studies 
from China and Malaysia show how state power and political elites are interwoven with 
corporations. 
 
The China case study showed that the Chinese state provides a range of different policies 
and an advanced framework for an enabling environment for Chinese renewable energy 
businesses. These legislative frameworks along with targeted financing and subsidies for 
wind energy businesses have helped foster a booming wind energy industry in China. This 
has proven favourable for local Chinese businesses and to some extent also for foreign 
direct investment by corporations such as Gamesa Eolica (Spain) and Vestas (Denmark) 
(Dechezlepetre et al. 2009). The role of the corporation should therefore not be seen as 
something distinct from the political but rather a part of a corporatist system. One could even 
argue that corporations are tools created and used by the Chinese state to achieve certain 
goals that go beyond simply making profits for its shareholders in a true Friedman sense.  
 
This strategy can also be observed in China’s overseas engagement, which involves SOEs, 
financiers and regulators. Since 2004 China has been following a ‘Going Out’ strategy in an 
attempt to meet its energy needs by encouraging outward investment and subsidising 
investment by Chinese companies in overseas resources and markets (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 
2008). According to the World Investment Report (Pamlin and Baijin 2007: 10), one of the 
key drivers for China’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is precisely because of a demand for 
natural resources (Pamlin and Baijin 2007) and the near-saturation of domestic markets (Liu 
and Kokko 2010). Pamlin and Baijin (2007) add that from 2000 to 2005, China’s FDI grew on 
average by 66 per cent per year. During the same time frame, Chinese companies launched 
28 overseas mergers and acquisitions in the energy and mining industries with an average 
deal value of US$ 280 million (Chang et al. 2010). 
 
In Malaysia, the level of state interference and state regulation in the energy, forestry and 
biofuel industry is paradoxical, compared to China and the US, and the sector is a mix of 
policy-driven and market-driven without clear dominations of either side. We have seen in 
the three case studies, but particularly in the Malaysian case, that sometimes there seems to 
be a case of ‘organised hypocrisy’ as elaborated by Brunsson. Brunsson (2003) describes 
how governments are often in a moral catch-22 as they often say one thing (the thing they 
want to do, but can’t do because of external pressure), but do another thing (the thing they 
can do because of external pressure, but do not necessarily want to do). In the case of 
Malaysia this means that the government would like to reduce emissions and contribute to 
climate change mitigation, this is why it is interested in biofuel production from palm oil and 
supports the CDM. On the other side, the government strives for economic growth, progress 
and development; this is why it tolerates the destruction of tropical forests by foreign and 
national corporations. The engagement of state-owned corporations like Petronas, which 
also engages in the palm oil exploitation, demonstrates the complexity of the issue. Often 
politics and business are entangled, there are multiple objectives, interests and motives and 
various positions. This case of ‘organised hypocrisy’ is typical of the power struggle that 
many states and corporations face today. Both China and Malaysia highlight the problems of 
defining the role of corporations vis-a-vis the state in climate change mitigation. 
 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
We argue that the role of corporations within governance needs to be discussed at more 
length since corporations play a large role in contributing to climate change (mitigation) and 
international climate governance. The objective of this paper was therefore to analyse the 
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role of corporations and the state for climate change mitigation and the transition towards a 
low carbon economy. In recent discussions the role between the state and corporations for 
climate change mitigation seems to have been blurred as responsibility to act on climate 
change rests with both actors. We therefore aimed to present an explorative study using 
three case studies from China, the US and Malaysia to highlight the role of corporations in 
three different contexts of climate change mitigation. The roles of corporations and states are 
inherently complex; it is far from easy to make a distinction between legal and voluntary 
obligations. A combination of the two sectors has implications for global climate governance 
as it indicates that both states and firms play an important role, which is often overlapping 
and contradictory in mitigating climate change. Often politics and business are entangled; 
there are multiple objectives, interests and motives and various positions. 
 
The three case studies presented in this paper show that US corporations have their own 
distinct policies when it comes to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and introducing 
renewable energy and they seem increasingly willing to push for climate change mitigation, 
but they lack the capacity to enforce an overall policy for all corporations. The 
implementation of their targets depends on voluntarism and their practices and policies 
create a patchwork of incoherent policies rather than national and enforceable legislation. 
Our study shows that apart from some cases in the US, corporations are highly affected by 
politics and dependent on political will.  
 
In China and Malaysia, the case is more complex as energy corporations are not distinct 
entities, but they are often (partly) state-owned or ‘Government Linked Corporations’. This 
casts a shadow on whose responsibility it is to enforce climate change mitigation and makes 
it difficult to distinguish between corporations which exist purely to make profit and those 
which are used as tools or instruments for the state to achieve specific goals. 
 
In terms of contributing to the theory of global governance and corporate citizenship for 
climate change mitigation, we suggest that to achieve mitigation at the global level, the 
complementarities of corporations and states needs to be further explored. One could argue 
there has been too much emphasis in the past on contradictory interests and conflicts 
between states and firms, rather than on complementarities and new forms of partnerships. 
Where states do not deliver sufficient national legislation for tackling climate change, 
corporations can play a key role in creating pressure and suggesting incentives and policies 
for pushing for state action. Nevertheless this needs to be a much more coherent and large-
scale approach than exists today. Where corporations do not follow national legislation for 
tackling climate change, states need to work with them and use them as tools for achieving 
climate-specific goals. This is done to some extent in authoritarian states like China, 
although often under non-transparent conditions and under very different power and 
ownership constellations than in democratic countries. Globally, new forms of public-private 
partnerships are needed for climate change mitigation. Finally, Civil Society can play a key 
role in monitoring and lobbying both public and private stakeholders and contributing to the 
design of new legislations, incentives and actions for the global public good. CSOs have 
been very active in the UNFCCC climate negotiations for years (e.g. Climate Action Network 
CAN, Oxfam, etc) and particularly the time around COP15 in Copenhagen saw a rise in new 
emerging NGOs that are active in climate advocacy. In recent years, new coalitions of CSOs 
and businesses have emerged (e.g. WWF and Climate Group teaming up with businesses), 
nevertheless this is not a large-scale global phenomenon yet. Exploring the 
complementarities of corporations, states and Civil Society in more depth, mapping out the 
powers and limitations of each of these stakeholders and creating new partnership models 
with designated tasks could have the potential to contribute to more effective global 
governance for climate change mitigation – nevertheless scaling-up of earlier pilot projects is 
now needed. 
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